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Abstract 
An influential body of scholarship has associated both democracy and democratization with 
civil war. Important findings include the so-called inverted U-shaped relationship between 
democracy-levels and civil war onset and that propensity for democratic openings to spark 
internal violence. However, most of these findings have been challenged, particularly by 
scholars pointing to problems with the aggregate nature of the analyses and the data sources 
used. Against this background, we enlist new, fine-grained data from the Varieties of 
Democracy (V-Dem) Project. We discuss how the new data can be used to disaggregate regime 
variables in order to better understand the causal dynamics that link the regime form and 
regime change to civil war onset, if any. Guided by these considerations, we use the new data to 
reassess the ‘inverted U-curve’. Our analysis shows that this relationship is driven by ‘liberal’ 
aspects of democracy such as freedom of assembly and freedom of speech rather than by the 
‘electoral core’ of democracy. The relationship between clean elections and civil war onset is 
approximately linearly decreasing, and at the indicator level of the clean elections attribute we 
find several different patterns. 
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Introduction 
In The Dark Side of Democracy, Michael Mann (2005) disturbingly claimed that the 
democratization processes of the 19th and 20th centuries had paved the way for large-scale ethnic 
cleansing. Mann’s book may be said to reflect a more general shift in the literature on 
democracy and democratization. The 1990s had been democracy’s Belle Époque, both on the 
ground and within academia. After a somewhat slow beginning in Southern Europe and Latin 
America, democracy in this decade spread like wildfire, accompanied by high hopes for progress 
in terms of peace, freedom, and prosperity (Møller & Skaaning 2013). Alas, the enthusiasm was 
not to last, neither on the ground nor within academia. The first decades of the 2000s have seen 
a widespread pessimism about the auspicious effects of democracy and democratization. 
Most importantly for our purposes, an influential research agenda has associated 
partially democratized regimes and democratization with civil war (see Hegre 2014; Gleditsch & 
Hegre 2014). At first sight, the notion that intermediate levels of democracy and the process of 
democratization spark internal conflict seems counterintuitive. Popular discontent should 
decrease with the level of democracy because political discrimination decreases and public 
goods provision increases (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Furthermore, democracy is normally 
construed as a method for solving societal conflicts in a peaceful way. For instance, scholars 
have argued that democracy allows effective bargaining among social groups, reduces 
commitment problems, and instills decisions with legitimacy (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006; 
Przeworski 2010). The notion that partial democracy and democratization might trigger internal 
conflicts is therefore a bold theoretical conjecture with high empirical relevance.  
In what follows, we first review this literature, singling out arguments for and against 
intermediate level of democracy and changes in the direction of democracy being conducive to 
civil war. We then enlist new data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project to shed 
light on selected prior findings. More generally, we discuss how these new data can be used to 
carry out more systematic appraisals of the relationship between democracy levels and 
democratization on the one hand and civil war on the other. 
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I. The case against democracy  
The arguments for why democracy may spur internal conflict relate to both the absolute level of 
democracy and to changes in the direction of democracy. With respect to the first issue, a 
number of scholars have identified a curve-linear relationship where the risk of civil war onset 
increases at lower rungs of the ladder of democracy but decreases at higher rungs (e.g., Muller & 
Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001). This has been termed the “inverted U-curve” as the likelihood 
of civil war onset is higher for partially democratized regimes (aka. anocracies or hybrid 
regimes) situated in the middle of the regime spectrum than for either genuine autocracies or 
genuine democracies.  
Theoretically, this relationship is attributed to the lack of steering capacity in partially 
democratized regimes. Autocracies use repression and cooptation to keep a lid on opposition, 
whereas democracies deal with societal grievances through political inclusion and public goods 
provision (Svolik 2012; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Partially democratized regimes, the 
argument goes, are less effective in both respects. While they allow oppositional mobilization 
and expression to a higher extent than autocracies, they are ineffective in addressing popular 
frustrations and often too weak to crush even minor rebellions. Hence, grievances are not dealt 
with but opportunities for airing them are high (Hegre 2014, 163; Gleditsch & Hegre 2014, 146-
7).  
With respect to democratization, prior scholarship has demonstrated that changes in 
levels of democracy increase the likelihood of armed conflict (Cederman, Hug & Krebs 2010; 
Mansfield & Snyder 2012). Democratization can spur civil war in several ways. Invoking 
Huntington’s (1968) seminal work on political order, Mansfield & Snyder (1995, 2005) argue 
that democratization tends to create mass mobilization that weak institutions cannot channel. In 
this situation, elites are wont to drum up nationalist sentiments, something that increases the 
risk of both interstate war and intrastate conflict.  
Other scholarship has focused more directly on the instability wrought by changes in 
political institutions (Gleditsch & Ruggeri 2010). The introduction of elections gives 
incumbents an incentive to use fraud and losers an avenue to dispute outcomes. This “sore 
looser” effect is likely to be aggravated in winner-takes-all systems where minority groups, 
which are bound to loose in democratic contest, may see fighting as their best chance for 
maintain or gaining power. On top of this, initial democratic reforms are normally only partial 
and therefore tend to create demand for more. If powerholders resist these demands, the result 
may be a descent into violence (Gleditsch & Hegre 2014, 149-150; see also Cederman, 
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Gleditsch & Hug 2013; Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom 2008). To make matters worse, many 
countries contain latent social conflicts that have been suppressed by authoritarian control. 
Competitive politics often serve to politicize such conflicts, including most notoriously 
antagonisms revolving around ethnic divides (Eifert, Miguel & Posner 2010; Horowitz 1985). 
This cocktail is inherently conflict prone – and sometimes causes the onset of civil war. 
 
II. Problems with prior research 
Although these claims have won wide acceptance, the literature contains a number of 
objections against the notion that democracy and democratization are conducive to armed 
conflict. First, confounding factors might affect both democratic institutions, changes in these, 
and the risk of civil war (Hegre 2014, 163; Gleditsch & Hegre 2014, 146). For instance, it might 
be political instability rather than specific regime characteristics that leads to conflict. Hybrid 
regimes can be seen as failed attempts to preserve power firmly in the hands of either the 
people or a strong, uncontested leader, and regime change per definition entails instability. In 
this situation, elections can serve as concession made because of the precarious position of the 
powers-that-be (Hegre 2014, 164-165). Next, socioeconomic development may drive both 
regime changes and conflict through, for example, its impact on inequality and the mobility of 
economic assets, both of which have been associated with regime change and internal conflict 
(see, e.g., Boix 2003; 2008). Finally, claims have been made to the effect that deeper historical 
processes centered on the distinction between inclusive and extractive political institutions 
create virtuous and vicious circles, respectively, which might affect both regime type and 
conflict propensity (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012).  
Second, the inverted U-curve might reflect reverse causality as armed conflicts are apt to 
weaken state institutions, at least in the short run (Gleditsch & Hegre 2014, 147-48). Similar 
objections can be made against the democratization-conflict nexus. If Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006) are correct that democratization is a concession elites give when they fear revolution, 
then it follows that democratization signals weakness – and, more generally, that 
democratization is endogenous to conflict. 
 Third, biases in our data sources might produce misleading conclusions. Most of the 
prominent statistical findings over the past decades are based on the well-known Polity index, 
which is a composite index (ranging from -10 to 10) that includes indicators related to the 
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, and 
the regulation and openness of political participation (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2014). As 
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Vreeland (2008) has convincingly argued, the Polity index can create biased results in analyses 
of the relationship between democracy-levels, democratization, and civil war because two of its 
components, “Regulation of Participation” and “Competiveness of Participation”, are expressly 
coded with reference to political violence. Indeed, it is exactly the middle values of these 
components that are “political violence-contaminated” (Vreeland 2008, 2). 
 
III. Disaggregating regime categories with new data 
As indicated by our review, the findings regarding the relationship between democracy and 
democratization, respectively, and civil war onset are inconclusive (see also Bartusevicius & 
Skaaning 2016; Cederman, Gleditsch & Hug 2013). To shed new light on the issue, recent 
studies have begun disaggregating the explanatory variable (Goldstone et al. 2010; see also 
Fjelde 2010). This is in line with the call by Gleditsch and Hegre (2014, 146) to unpack regime 
categories to investigate “how the specific characteristics of political institutions” affect conflict. 
Gleditsch and Hegre illustrate this by pointing out that the inverted U-curve is in itself a very 
poor – or at least overly general – measurement of the way political regimes affect conflict 
(Gleditsch & Hegre 2014, 148). Furthermore, by disaggregating characteristics of political 
regimes and looking into which specific institutions of democracy are actually driving the 
conflict potential that prior scholarship has identified, we might be able to work out empirical 
implications of competing theories, which right now – on the aggregate level – predict similar 
outcomes (Hegre 2014, 168).  
The literature has already moved in this direction by, for example, using the 
disaggregated Polity-indicators rather than the general index. But to genuinely push this research 
agenda forward, we need more nuanced indicators of more particular aspects of political 
regimes. First, we need to make sure that the results are not driven by indicators being 
contaminated by political violence but we need to do this in a much more systematical way than 
Vreeland was able to with the Polity data. Second, we need to go to a level of disaggregation 
that allows us to probe the theoretical mechanisms that have been used to explain why partially 
democratized regimes and democratization, respectively, may increase the risk of conflict. 
Fortunately, the V-Dem Project has recently released this kind of data. In what follows 
we use these new data to carry out a rather simple replication of the analysis of the inverted U-
curve at different levels of aggregation. Our aim is to assess whether a similar pattern is 
produced when using different components and sub-components of democracy. Subsequently, 
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we discuss further possibilities this new dataset give scholars interested in investigating the 
relationship between democracy, democratization, and civil war onset. 
 
The V-Dem data 
V-Dem is a large-scale data collection effort that includes more than 350 new, disaggregated 
indicators. The dataset covers most sovereign and semi-sovereign polities from 1900 until 
today, and the data capture various conceptions of democracy and their components in a 
detailed fashion. About half of the indicators, typically of a more factual nature, have been 
coded by research assistants. The other half, typically of a more evaluative nature, are assigned 
scores on the basis of expert surveys, normally five country experts per indicator. The expert 
assessments are combined into point estimates with uncertainty levels. This is done through the 
employment of a sophisticated Bayesian item response measurement model that takes into 
account varying levels of reliability, bias, and standards (‘thresholds’) among coders (Coppedge 
et al. 2016a).      
 In what follows, we concentrate on the data pertaining to the V-Dem electoral 
democracy index (see Teorell et al. 2016). This index is based on Dahl’s (1998) seminal 
conception of polyarchy, and as illustrated in Figure 1 it subsumes the following five attributes: 
clean elections, elected executive, suffrage, freedom of association, and freedom of expression. 
The measurement of these five attributes – or indices – aggregates the scores of no less than 38 
indicators. For instance, as illustrated in Figure 1, the clean elections index alone is based on 
nine indicators (more on this below). 
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Figure 1: Disaggregation of Electoral democracy index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: EMB is an abbreviation for “election management body”.  
 
Empirical analysis 
We have put together a simple statistical model that includes the most basic confounders of 
civil war onset identified in the literature: GDP per capita (logged, from the Maddison 
Database; Bolt & van Zanden 2014), population size (logged, from Haber & Menaldo 2011), 
and prior war (time polynomials capturing peace years). Civil war onset is measured using the 
Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (v. 3.0; Gleditsch et al., 2002). This dataset includes 
every armed conflict between a government and a rebel organization known to have caused at 
least 25 annual battle-related deaths in the period 1946-2014.1 When we regress the V-Dem 
electoral democracy index against civil war onset for the period 1946-2010, we get the results 
reported in Figure 2.  
																																								 																				
1 The onset variable indicates the year in which an armed conflict started, and observations with ongoing 
conflict are dropped. 
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Figure 2: The probability of civil war onset at different levels of electoral democracy  
 
Note: The figure reports margins based on logistic regression. GDP per capita (logged), population size (logged), 
and prior war (peace-year polynomials) are included as control variables. The shared area indicates the 90% 
confidence interval.  
As Figure 2 shows, at this level of aggregation the new data clearly corroborates the 
inverted U-curve relationship. However, the question is what drives the relationship between 
levels of electoral democracy and civil war onset? To get a better sense of this, we have run the 
same model with three of the attribute-level indices, namely clean election, freedom of 
association, and freedom of expression. The two remaining attribute-level indices, universal 
suffrage and elected executive, tend towards a bimodal distribution and therefore cannot 
explain – or be meaningfully used to assess – the inverted U-curve.2  
Figure 3 shows that the freedom of association and freedom of expression attributes 
sustain the finding of partially democratized regimes being most conflict prone: It is the 
intermediate scores on these indices that display the highest probability of civil war onset. By 
contrast, the cleanness of elections is consistently associated with decreasing probabilities of 
conflict except for the lowest scores on the index. Thus, the inverted U-curve seems to be 
driven by partially granted freedom rights rather than the “electoral core” of democracy, here 
																																								 																				
2 The bimodal distributions reflect that fulfillment of the formal requirements for having an elected executive or 
universal suffrage is very much an ‘either-or’ question in the post-WWII period that we investigate. 
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measured by the attribute of clean elections. This finding is interesting because it indicates that 
it is liberal rather than electoral aspects of democracy that underpins the inverted U-curve 
relationship.  
Interestingly, this is the case even though two of the nine clean elections-indicators 
(electoral violence and government intimidation) capture the presence of violence, meaning that 
one could potentially run into the same problem of ‘tautology’ that Vreeland (2008) has 
identified regarding analyses relying on the Polity index. On the contrary, the indices of 
freedom of association and freedom of expression, where the reverse U-curve manifested itself, 
do not contain such violence-contaminated indicators. This seems puzzling, and we therefore 
pursue the analysis down to the indicator level for the clean elections index. This also serves to 
show some of the possibilities of using the V-Dem data. Notice in this connection that an 
advantage of going to the indicator level is that we can assign substantial meaning to the 
different scores, something that is not possible at the higher levels of measurement employed in 
Figures 2 and 3, where a particular aggregate score can reflect very different combinations of 
indicator scores. 
 
Figure 3: The probability of civil war onset at different levels of the electoral democracy 
attributes 
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Note: The figure reports margins based on logistic regression. GDP per capita (logged), population size (logged), 
and prior war (peace-year polynomials) are included as control variables. Each model also controls for the four 
remaining attribute-level indices of electoral democracy as illustrated in Figure 1. The shared area indicates the 90% 
confidence interval.  
Figure 4 reports results for seven out of nine of the clean elections indicators.3 The 
figure shows that two of the clean election indicators (electoral violence and government 
intimidation) produce an inverted U-curve, while three others (voter registry, EMB autonomy,4 
and election irregularities) produce a very flat curve. Finally, two of the indicators behave quite 
differently from the rest. Vote buying produces a flat but negative linear relationship, and EMB 
capacity is approximately convex, meaning that the likelihood of civil war onset decreases more 
with the first improvements in the capacity of election management bodies. The most 
interesting thing here is that the indicators displaying the inverted U-curve are exactly those 
contaminated by violence. If we put these aside on the basis of Vreeland’s (2008) objection, 
there is no evidence of electoral aspects of democracy producing anything like an inverted U-
curve relationship.  
What can we say about the particular levels and conflict onset on the clean elections 
indicators? For the indicators producing a concave relationship, the risk of civil war onset 
generally seems to be the highest somewhere between the scores 1 and 2. If we take election 
irregularities as an example, the codebook descriptions of these scores are “non-systematic, but 
common” (the score 1) and “sporadic” (the score 2) irregularities. Concerning government 
intimidation, the risk of armed conflict is markedly higher at the score 2, indicating “non-
systematic” intimidation of the opposition, compared to the score 1, indicating “systematic” 
intimidation of the opposition (Coppedge et al. 2016b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
3 One of the excluded indicators, free and fair elections is too general for our purpose, while the other, capturing 
electoral interruptions, is dichotomous. 
4 “EMB” is an abbreviation for electoral management body. 
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Figure 4: The probability of civil war onset at different levels of the clean elections 
indicators 
 
Note: The figure reports margins based on logistic regression. GDP per capita (logged), population size (logged), 
and prior war (peace-year polynomials) are included as control variables. Each model also controls for the four 
remaining attribute-level indices of electoral democracy as well as the remaining clean election indicators (see 
Figure 1). The shared area indicates the 90% confidence interval. EMB is an abbreviation for “election 
management body”.   
 The presented results show some of the potential that the new V-Dem data holds. We 
have run similar large-N analyses to assess the relationship between democratization and civil 
war onset. Generally speaking, these results go a long way towards corroborating Cederman, 
Hug, and Krebs’ (2010) finding that democratization is more conducive to civil war than 
autocratization. However, space limitation prevents us from presenting and interpreting these 
findings.5 Instead, we end this piece by briefly discussing other ways the new data released by 
the V-Dem make it possible to further scholarship on the relationship between democracy and 
democratization, respectively, and civil war. 
																																								 																				
5 Likewise, we do not have space to explain the way we have modelled this, including the way to measure 
democratization and autocratization. However, interested readers can contact the authors to receive the results of 
these analyses. 
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IV. The way forward 
To get bang for the buck, the attempt to disaggregate the measurement of political regimes 
should be backed up by two other analytical moves. First, the existing literature has not 
adequately studied the specific conditions that could potentially moderate the democracy-
conflict relationship. For example, democratization and the introduction of multiparty elections 
during an economic crisis could increase zero-sum conflicts and ethnic-divisionary sentiments 
much more than is the case during periods of rapid economic growth. Hence, democratization 
during economic downturns could enhance the risk of conflicts while democratization during 
periods of rapid economic growth may be much more peaceful. Other potential conditioning 
factors include levels of political or socio-economic exclusion and levels of state capacity 
(Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug 2013; Sobek 2010). 
 Second, we would do well to go historical in investigation of the relationship between 
democracy, democratization, and civil war. As Hegre (2014, 168) puts it, we need to analyze the 
dynamics between socio-economic processes, regime change, and conflict. This calls for 
analyses of longer time-series, and for historical investigations of critical events and periods.  
 On both account, the V-Dem data can assist us. The new dataset includes a number of 
other indicators that can be seen as specifications of potential conditioning factors. Coupled 
with additional new datasets on socio-economic factors, it should be possible to systematically 
inquire into the way the effects of regime characteristics on civil war onset are conditioned by 
other factors. With respect to historical investigations, the V-Dem data go back to 1900. It is 
therefore less vulnerable to the objection that the regime-conflict nexus may have been 
suppressed in certain periods, say during the Cold War (see Møller 2016). Furthermore, an 
offshoot of the V-Dem project, the so-called Historical V-Dem, is currently coding selected 
indicators all the way back to 1789. Once this dataset is available, it will open new possibilities 
for analyzing the way sequences of democratization and autocratization have historically 
affected the propensity for civil war. Here, we stand to benefit from the fact that very different 
sequences of democratization occurred in the long 19th century (see Ziblatt 2006; Knutsen, 
Møller & Skaaning forthcoming). Historical analysis of these processes presents a way to 
address, inter alia, the issues raised in the “sequencing debate” about whether electoral 
democratization should be postponed until effective, political institutions have been 
constructed (see Mansfield & Snyder 2007; Carothers 2007). 
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Conclusions 
The new scholarship that has associated democracy and democratization with civil war onset is 
very relevant both theoretically and empirically. However, its findings have been challenged by a 
number of scholars, often with reference to the aggregate nature of the analyses and the poor 
quality of extant data for key variables. There seems to be an emerging consensus that it is 
necessary to enlist new data and to further disaggregate regime characteristics to genuinely 
probe these relationships. In this chapter, we have reviewed this literature and we have 
illustrated empirically how the new V-Dem data lends itself to heed these calls. 
Doing so, we have shown that the so-called inverted U-curve relationship is much more 
pronounced for some attributes of democracy, say, freedom of speech and assembly, than for 
other attributes, say, clean elections. Furthermore, when we drill down to the indicator level of 
the electoral attribute, the relationship disappeared completely with exception of the few 
indicators contaminated by violence. A similar disaggregation could be done in analyses of the 
relationship between democratization and autocratization, respectively, and civil war onset. 
Furthermore, the new data lend itself both to more systematical analysis of the extent to which 
these relationships are conditioned by other factors and to historical investigation of processes 
of regime change, including the historical sequencing of regime characteristics. 
 Our review of the literature and the new data that we have presented show that 
democracy is not a magic wand – at least not in situations where a genuine fulfillment of 
democratic criteria is still beckoning. There is quite some evidence that partial democracy does 
sometime spark conflict. Does this mean that democracy has a dark side? In a sense, the answer 
to this question depends very much on the baseline. Democratization inherently has a violent 
potential in the sense that it can be seen as a means for deprived groups to get their say, and 
hence their piece of the pie. But well-functioning democracy is a means for peacefully solving 
social conflicts. This is the Janus-faced reality of the democratization-conflict nexus. The real-
world relevance of this dilemma need hardly be stressed. 
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